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ABSTRACT: Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in 
terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics 
assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I 
respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of 
responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this 
political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between 
the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many 
responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ 
political liberalism as well. 
 
RÉSUMÉ : Selon l’égalitarisme de la fortune, la justice distributive est à comprendre en 
termes de notre capacité d’être responsables de nos choix. Tant les partisans que les 
opposants d’un tel égalitarisme présupposent qu’il doit être fondé sur une conception 
compréhensive de la responsabilité. Je réponds aux opposants en développant une 
conception politique de la responsabilité qui demeure agnostique devant la 
métaphysique du libre choix. Pour ce faire, je propose une relecture de la distinction 
rawlsienne entre le politique et le compréhensif. Une conséquence surprenante est que 
de nombreuses objections à l’égalitarisme de la fortune s’avèrent être des objections au 
libéralisme de Rawls. 
 
Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our 
capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics of luck 
egalitarianism assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of 
responsibility. Such conceptions make controversial metaphysical claims about free 
choice. Those claims conflict with the moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines held 
by many reasonable citizens. Yet any adequate theory of equality must, in principle, be 
endorsable by all reasonable citizens, that is, it must be articulated in public, political 
terms that all reasonable citizens could endorse. I achieve that end by providing a 
limited, political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of 
free choice. I construct this political conception out of John Rawls’ political conception of 
the citizen as having a moral power to create, revise, and pursue a conception of the 
good, and out of the deeply embedded commitment of citizens in democratic states to 
see each other as capable of being responsible for their choices. 
I also respond to pessimism in the literature regarding what a political conception 
of responsibility can include. On the pessimistic view, a merely political (not 
metaphysical) conception can only comprise responsibility in the sense of role-based 
obligations, not the sense of being responsible for the consequences of one’s actions.1 
However, the foundation of political liberalism includes certain commitments regarding 	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  both sorts of responsibility. I develop a more textually faithful and philosophically 
powerful reading of Political Liberalism than the pessimist, and I argue for a rich and 
inclusive interpretation of Rawls’ notion of the political.2 A surprising consequence is 
that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be just as 
much objections to Rawls’ political liberalism. The target range of these arguments goes 
far beyond disputes over luck egalitarian theories of distributive justice. 
 
1. Equality and Responsibility 
Luck egalitarianism is an understanding of equality that attempts to minimize the 
influence of luck and maximize the influence of choice on each individual’s condition. It 
treats inequalities differently based on their causal origins. Whether a given inequality is 
just is primarily determined by the relevant agent’s degree of responsibility for his 
condition. This approach to equality is fundamentally concerned with those who are 
worse off than others through no fault of their own. Paradigm examples of unjust 
inequalities are disabilities and burdens for which the bearer is not responsible.  
Luck egalitarians, including Ronald Dworkin, Gerald Cohen, and Richard 
Arneson, define equality in terms of choice, luck, and responsibility. Defining equality in 
a way that is sensitive to responsibility requires some theoretical account of 
responsibility. The luck egalitarians have (implicitly and explicitly) relied on full, 
comprehensive theories of responsibility. That is unacceptable because it ignores the 
fact of reasonable pluralism—we can never reach consensus among free citizens on a 
full, comprehensive theory of responsibility, and therefore these theories are only 
endorsable by a subset of citizens.3 Many citizens have comprehensive philosophical, 
moral, or religious views that contain specific commitments regarding responsibility. Our 
theory of equality should be independent of such views. A comprehensive luck 
egalitarian theory is only endorsable by those citizens who affirm a comprehensive 
conception of responsibility that is consistent with the theory. When dealing with matters 
of basic justice, such as the general principles that will guide the distribution of benefits 
and burdens in society, luck egalitarians ought to rely on a limited, political conception 
of responsibility that all citizens could, in principle, endorse. `In principle’ means that the 
theory is expressed in public, political terms, and that endorsement of the theory does 
not require adherence to any particular comprehensive view of responsibility or the 
good.  
Luck egalitarianism was originally inspired by Rawls’ idea that whatever is 
arbitrary from the moral point of view ought neither to influence our choice of principles 
of justice, nor determine the distribution of benefits and burdens in a society. Despite 
that, luck egalitarians have not been engaged with Rawls’ later political liberalism. It has 
gone unnoticed that Rawls’ later work provides us with the resources to articulate a 
conception of responsibility that is agnostic on the metaphysics of free will. This new 
approach recognizes a distinction between political and comprehensive conceptions of 
responsibility. 
Rawls reached his position of political liberalism as a response to reasonable 
pluralism. 4  The free exercise of reason will not converge on any particular 	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  comprehensive conception of the good. Comprehensive conceptions of the good 
include Catholicism, utilitarianism, Kantianism, and so on. Since citizens in a free 
democratic society will never agree on a comprehensive conception of the good, they 
ought not use comprehensive reasons to settle matters of basic justice and 
constitutional essentials. Rather, they ought to appeal to a political conception of justice 
based on values that are important to everyone simply as citizens. Reasons articulated 
in terms of public, political values have a special modal character such that any 
reasonable citizen could endorse them because they appeal to values that can matter to 
each individual citizen, regardless of what else matters to them. Such endorsement 
does not require adherence to any particular comprehensive conception of the good. 
The political is characterized by three criteria: applying to the basic structure of 
society, being presented independently of any comprehensive doctrine, and being 
elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society. 5  The idea of a political conception of 
responsibility has been underexplored, and when it has been considered, the 
conclusions have been too pessimistic about what such a conception could include. We 
can have a surprisingly rich political conception of responsibility, elaborated from a 
political conception of the person as free and in possession of a moral power to create, 
revise, and pursue a conception of the good, and from a set of fundamental beliefs and 
practices regarding responsibility that are implicit in the public political culture. This 
political conception resolves the problems with endorsability raised earlier and answers 
those who think luck egalitarianism requires a libertarian view of responsibility. 
 
2. Luck Egalitarianism, Metaphysics, and Endorsability 
Luck egalitarians have generally ignored or rejected Rawls’ distinction between the 
comprehensive and the political. Their theories have developed without any concern for 
his duty of civility, which obligates us to justify decisions on fundamental political issues 
in terms of public values and public standards.6 However, luck egalitarianism has often 
been presented as a view that is in fact widely endorsable, because it is based on ideas 
about responsibility and fairness that enjoy wide support. The idea that persons should 
generally bear the benefits or burdens of their choices does have widespread 
agreement, and this has been presented as a virtue of the theory. G.A. Cohen 
emphasizes this point, and argues that luck egalitarianism reclaims the values of 
individual choice and responsibility from the anti-egalitarians.7  
This virtue as found in the literature is focused solely on the fact that the basic 
ideas behind luck egalitarianism share widespread support in the public culture. No one 
has argued that this foundation can be elaborated in a way that remains widely 
endorsable. The best way to do that is to give a responsibility-sensitive theory of 
equality that appeals to a political, not comprehensive, conception of responsibility. The 
way luck egalitarianism has developed so far has undermined its own foundation in 
something that enjoys widespread prior agreement. 
Samuel Scheffler’s criticism of luck egalitarianism displays a keen awareness of 
this distinction between the basis of a theory and its elaboration. He objects that any 	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  attempt to elaborate a complete luck egalitarian theory undermines this virtue.8 He 
grants that luck egalitarianism does start from a principle that is deeply embedded and 
widely shared in the public culture. What shares widespread agreement is a ‘principle of 
responsibility’ that persons should be equal in the degree to which they are in control of 
their lives, and that inequalities borne by parties who are not responsible for their 
condition are different from inequalities borne by parties who are responsible for their 
condition. 
Scheffler argues that luck egalitarianism only has this ecumenical virtue when its 
claims about choice and equality remain so unspecified that they are little more than 
tautologies. There is some obvious link between choice, responsibility, and it being fair 
that agents bear the costs of their own choices. But the principle itself does not tell us 
what to do in particular cases or how to distinguish between responsible choices and 
luck-determined circumstances. A luck egalitarian theory needs to do both of those 
things. Filling out the theory requires making claims that do not share wide agreement. 
He concludes that luck egalitarianism’s wide basis of prior agreement is illusory. If we 
keep that virtue, there is nothing to be done with the theory. It is too thin. If we specify 
the theory to the point where it says something concrete, we lose that advantage.  
Scheffler observes that a typical way to fill out a theory and answer these 
questions is to give a comprehensive theoretical distinction between responsibility and 
luck, such as Dworkin’s distinction between the person and the circumstances 
surrounding the person, or Gerald Cohen’s distinction between choice and that which is 
not sensitive to choice. Another way to fill out the theory is to understand responsibility 
in terms of identification with one’s actions, tastes, and preferences—seeing these as 
essential parts of the self. Scheffler objects that any appeal to moral responsibility that 
draws on voluntary choice or identification is so comprehensive and controversial that it 
loses the alleged benefit of luck egalitarianism being based on a principle on which 
there is widespread agreement. If our egalitarian theory appeals to moral responsibility, 
Scheffler argues that this appeal must rely on claims about free will or identification or 
something similar, and those claims are much more comprehensive and controversial 
than the ‘principle of responsibility.’ According to Scheffler, luck egalitarians need to 
spell out some controversial conception of moral responsibility all the way down to the 
metaphysical bases of choice and responsibility.  
We do need to provide a conception of responsibility that gives content to the 
theory, that describes the powers that make us able to be responsible for things, that 
gives us a way to distinguish cases of luck from cases of responsibility, and that 
describes paradigm cases of that for which we are to be held responsible. Rawls 
provides a form of elaboration that can achieve these tasks in a way that remains 
political and therefore, in principle, endorsable by all citizens. While this goes beyond 
what has explicit widespread prior agreement, it retains its character as political. The 
elaboration of the theory can be given in solely political terms, starting with a political 
conception of the person as free and in possession of a power to form, revise, and 
pursue a conception of the good. 
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  Both the luck egalitarians and Scheffler have made an error. The luck 
egalitarians have ignored or rejected the political approach found in Rawls’ later work, 
and have not recognized that we can adapt Rawls’ techniques to distinguish 
comprehensive and political theories of responsibility. Scheffler also ignores that 
distinction in this context, and he sets the standard far too high for what it is to have a 
philosophical position that is based on widespread support in the public culture. Luck 
egalitarianism need not aim for a full theory based only in what has explicit and 
widespread prior agreement. Rather, luck egalitarians should start from a core ideal that 
already has widespread support and elaborate a theory in political, non-comprehensive 
terms. When we elaborate the view in this way, we do not forsake the virtue of providing 
a theory that remains true to the core ideal on which people are already in general 
agreement. We elaborate the theory in terms that are still, in principle, endorsable by all 
citizens. 
This strategy also answers a family of metaphysical objections to luck 
egalitarianism. Scheffler argues that, by appealing to responsibility, luck egalitarianism 
must give some controversial metaphysical account of choice and responsibility. He 
concludes that luck egalitarianism needs a libertarian understanding of free will. 
Libertarian free will is incompatible with causal determinism and requires that an agent 
has multiple alternative possible actions. A more general form of this objection is that if 
egalitarian theory can avoid the deeply puzzling metaphysics of free will, it ought to do 
so, and it can only avoid the metaphysics of free will by not conceiving of equality as 
highly sensitive to responsibility. 
Cohen gives the standard luck egalitarian response to this worry. “[W]e may 
indeed be up to our necks in the free will problem, but that is just tough luck. It is not a 
reason for not following the argument where it goes.”9 I argue instead that a political 
form of luck egalitarianism can remain agnostic on the comprehensive metaphysical 
questions raised by responsibility. Thus we can resolve this metaphysical worry without 
following Scheffler’s solution of rejecting luck egalitarianism’s appeal to responsibility. 
Scheffler argues that:  
 
[t]he plausibility of [luck egalitarianism] will depend on how the relevant notions of 
choice, control, and moral responsibility are understood. The thesis will seem 
most plausible if those notions are given a libertarian or incompatibilist 
interpretation, according to which genuinely voluntary choices belong to a 
different metaphysical category than do other causal factors. If the distinction 
between choices and unchosen circumstances is viewed as a fundamental 
metaphysical distinction, then it may seem capable of bearing the enormous 
political and economic weight that luck egalitarianism places on it.10  
 
Scheffler thinks that the luck egalitarian appeal to responsibility only carries weight if 
choices and circumstances are in radically different metaphysical categories, and this is 
only the case if libertarianism is true. Libertarianism is the view that free human action is 
not subject to deterministic causal laws. Scheffler thinks that if the only form of 
responsibility we can have is a compatibilist sort, the force of luck egalitarianism 	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  dissipates. If equality is defined in terms of our free, voluntary choices, then those 
choices must be fundamentally different from other forms of causation. We must be 
capable of making choices that are not causally determined by prior events, and we 
must have genuine alternative courses of action. 
This criticism of luck egalitarianism assumes that compatibilists can give, at best, 
an instrumental account of praise, blame, punishment, reward, and all the other features 
of responsibility. On that account, practical application of the concept of responsibility is 
justified solely because this can shape future behaviour. On this line of thought, human 
actions are only different from other caused events in virtue of being shapeable by the 
practice of holding people responsible, but that does not entail that we are genuinely 
responsible for our choices and actions. 
J.J.C. Smart held this type of instrumental view.11  He argued that genuine 
responsibility ascriptions require only that the expression of such judgments can cause 
good changes in behaviour. Suppose Tommy doesn’t do his homework. If this is 
because he is incapable of doing so, and the material is beyond his ability, then there is 
no point in expressing any harsh judgment. If he is lazy, there is a point. It can improve 
his behaviour by causing him to do what it takes to avoid being the subject of such 
judgments in the future. (Whether this works in a particular case will of course depend 
on myriad causal factors.) Expressing these judgments can improve behaviour even if 
Tommy’s laziness stems from deterministic factors outside his control and he is 
therefore not causally responsible for his current laziness. We have a pragmatic 
justification for using the concept of responsibility and its attendant practices that is 
consistent with determinism.  
Scheffler thinks compatibilists can do no better than the instrumental account of 
responsibility. Since the instrumental view does not entail that any of our choices are 
fundamentally different from other caused events, he concludes that compatibilism 
undermines the importance that luck egalitarianism attaches to the distinction between 
choice and luck. But compatibilism includes views that choice and responsibility 
genuinely exist, even if (or only if) determinism is true. Such views do not all take 
Smart’s instrumental line. Harry Frankfurt, for example, is a compatibilist who surely 
does not.12 He thinks one has free will, and is responsible for one’s choices, when one 
acts for one’s own reasons and one has the will one wants. Compatibilists do not think 
that they are giving a second rate explanation of the difference between responsibility 
and luck. A compatibilist can run Scheffler’s argument in the opposite direction and 
conclude that a libertarian conception of freedom and responsibility lacks a clearly 
definable notion of control that would be sufficient to bear the weight of a luck 
egalitarian theory. On that view, any indeterministic gap in the explanation of an act 
undermines responsibility. 
Scheffler needs another argument to establish that only a metaphysical 
distinction between choice and luck can support the theory. He would then need 	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  another argument to conclude that compatibilism is deficient on this point. However, we 
do not need to appeal to different metaphysical categories. Compatibilism can 
recognize a genuine moral distinction between choice and lack of choice, freedom and 
coercion, responsibility and lack of responsibility.  
Compatibilist luck egalitarians are free to develop such comprehensive 
responses to Scheffler. My core response is political. All we need to invoke is a political 
conception of responsibility, not anything having to do with fundamental metaphysical 
categories. If we do that, then we can answer both of the worries raised in this section. 
We can show that a fully elaborated luck egalitarian theory remains highly endorsable, 
and that it does not get bogged down in controversial metaphysical claims. 
 
3. The Political Distinction 
Rawls understands a political conception of justice to be a module that can fit into 
different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The set of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines can join in an overlapping consensus, from which each member has a 
commitment to a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is 
freestanding in the sense that it is endorsable on the basis of shared, public reasons 
that appeal to the values that speak to all of us qua citizens. These include equality of 
opportunity, social equality, economic reciprocity, and others.13 “The political conception 
[of justice] can be seen as part of a comprehensive doctrine but it is not a consequence 
of that doctrine’s nonpolitical values.”14 
Rawls never discussed a political conception of responsibility, but we can build a 
freestanding conception of responsibility that is not just a consequence of one’s 
comprehensive view of free will and moral responsibility but rather elaborated solely in 
terms of fundamental political ideas that constitute the public political culture of a 
democratic society. The very same foundation that Rawls gives for political liberalism 
can be used to generate a conception of responsibility that is adequate for luck 
egalitarian purposes. The way this political conception of responsibility will fit into a 
comprehensive doctrine is slightly different from Rawls’ description of a political 
conception of justice. Responsibility poses some peculiar problems for the 
political/comprehensive distinction. If one has a comprehensive metaphysical view of 
the foundations of freedom and responsibility, that will provide the fundamental 
explanation of responsibility. My task is to show how that can be the case while the 
political conception remains something freestanding and public. I claim that the political 
conception can remain agnostic on these fundamental metaphysical questions. This 
means that all citizens can endorse the political conception as true, or at least as 
reasonable. 
Let me present a metaphor. A political conception of responsibility is the trunk of 
a tree. It is above ground, visible, something we can all hold onto. Comprehensive 
conceptions of responsibility are individual root structures below the ground. Imagine a 
complex array of roots, and each path you can trace from a root terminus up through 
the trunk is a particular comprehensive conception of responsibility. In this metaphor, 
when we discuss responsibility on the political level we are completely non-committal 	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  about the root structure. We acknowledge that different reasonable persons affirm 
different root structures, and that some hold no beliefs about the root structure at all. 
My task is to provide a freestanding conception of responsibility that remains 
agnostic on the metaphysics underlying responsibility. The freestanding conception is 
political and thus endorsable by all. Of course, any appeal to responsibility raises 
metaphysical questions about free will, but those as comprehensive issues that go 
beyond the fundamental concerns of luck egalitarianism as it applies to the basic 
structure of society and matters of basic justice. It is not the case that any claim about 
responsibility that raises further comprehensive questions about responsibility must 
itself be comprehensive. If the political is closed in that way, then it is impossible to 
make any political claims about agency, autonomy, objectivity, or responsibility. On the 
contrary, genuinely political conceptions of responsibility (or any other aspect of justice) 
can directly raise comprehensive questions. Below I argue that almost all of Rawls’ 
fundamental claims about political liberalism immediately raise comprehensive 
questions. If one objects that the political must be completely isolated from the 
comprehensive, political liberalism becomes incoherent. 
Consider the following two forms of responsibility. Role-based responsibility has 
to do with the obligations that attach to different roles or identities. Examples of role-
based responsibility include the parent’s responsibility to care for the child, the teacher’s 
responsibility to instruct the pupil, and so on. The second form is causal responsibility, 
which has to do with the way that agents can be accountable for states of affairs that 
they cause in the right way through their actions or negligence. For example, if I choose 
to cut down a tree, and it crushes my neighbour’s home, I am causally responsible for 
the state of affairs of his home being crushed. I have a type of ownership over that state 
of affairs in virtue of the way I am causally responsible for it. These two types of 
responsibility are basically the same as T.M. Scanlon’s notions of substantive and 
attributive responsibility.15 
Both forms of responsibility are important for determining the fair distribution of 
benefits and burdens in a society, even though I will argue that the two categories 
cannot be completely separated. Role-based responsibility has a general or structural 
importance.16 It helps us understand the fair terms of social cooperation by telling us 
what obligations citizens have. As discussed in the next section, citizens have 
obligations to bear the consequences of their own tastes and preferences. Causal 
responsibility, on the other hand, plays two different roles. As the luck egalitarians 
emphasize, it shows us how to determine whether individual variation in a distribution is 
just or unjust. Other things being equal, inequalities stemming from luck will be treated 
differently from inequalities stemming from choice. It also shows us something about the 
fair terms of social cooperation by revealing the capacities and powers of the agent. 
Those capacities and powers that underlie causal responsibility are fundamental to our 
conception of the person and to our understanding of what we can reasonably expect of 
each other. 
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  Causal responsibility is closer to the metaphysical level than role-based 
responsibility. It deals with how states of affairs can justifiably be attributed to agents 
because they were brought about in the right way by their choices and actions, or their 
inaction and culpable negligence. This is the locus of the classical problems of moral 
responsibility and free will. Role-based responsibility is further from the metaphysical 
level because it deals with the obligations attached to certain identities or roles or 
contexts. Those questions have to do primarily with norms of behaviour and social 
cooperation. 
For this reason, Michael Blake and Mathias Risse argue that a political 
conception of responsibility could only include role-based responsibility, not causal 
responsibility. 17 Causal responsibility appears to involve controversial metaphysical 
commitments, while role-based responsibility can be understood as a consequence of 
persons participating in society as a joint cooperative venture. The former has been 
understood as comprehensive and metaphysical, the latter as institutional and political. 
Luck egalitarianism could never be a political view because it relies on causal 
responsibility. In determining whether an inequality is just, luck egalitarianism looks at 
whether the bearer of that benefit or burden is causally responsible for his own 
predicament.  
I argue that the political can give us a limited conception of causal responsibility 
that is a sufficient basis for a responsibility-sensitive theory of equality. Blake and Risse 
represent the only investigation thus far into political conceptions of responsibility. Their 
discussion is enlightening, but their conclusions are too pessimistic about the 
possibilities of political responsibility. We can elaborate a political conception of 
responsibility from Rawls’ political conception of the person as free and in possession of 
two moral powers, from various beliefs and practices that are deeply embedded in the 
public culture, and from the importance of reasonable pluralism.  
The first moral power of Rawls’ political conception of the person is the ability to 
create, revise, and pursue a comprehensive conception of the good. Rawls also applies 
this moral power to objects other than our conceptions of the good, such as our tastes, 
preferences, and desires. Rawls argues that we have obligations to revise all of those 
things in light of what we can reasonably expect, and he explicitly links that obligation to 
our first moral power. The first moral power should be understood as a general capacity, 
not something that only applies to comprehensive doctrines. 
Rawls does not see this as just a mechanism that works through us, but as a 
power that we can freely exert. He argues that the citizen is free for two reasons. First, 
in a democratic society citizens just see each other as free; this is a deeply embedded 
belief in the public culture. Second, the freedom of persons is generated by “their moral 
powers and their having a conception of the good.”18 So this moral power is not merely 
a process that generates and revises individual comprehensive doctrines. We can freely 
create, revise, and pursue our conceptions of the good. If that is the case, we can be 
responsible for the products or consequences of how we exert this moral power. We 
can be responsible for our conception of the good, and for the way we expend primary 
goods in our pursuit of the good. We can also be responsible for our tastes and 	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  preferences because, even if they did not originate as a product of our free choice, we 
can revise and take responsibility for them. 
This is sufficient for a limited but significant political conception of causal 
responsibility. If we have a power to form and revise a conception of the good, and we 
freely exert that power, then we can be responsible for our comprehensive doctrines. 
We will not universally see these as products of environment or socialization, but at 
least in some cases as products of genuine agency. 
If we only have comprehensive, not political, reasons to believe that we can be 
causally responsible for our comprehensive doctrines, then the whole foundation of 
political liberalism disintegrates. Political liberalism is not agnostic on our capacity to be 
causally responsible. If we could not be responsible for our comprehensive doctrines, 
what would be the importance of reasonable pluralism? Reasonable pluralism 
generates a duty of civility that requires us to justify our claims about matters of basic 
justice in public, political terms that all could endorse. That amounts to a form of 
respect. We ought not decide fundamental political matters in comprehensive terms that 
only fellow adherents of our comprehensive doctrine can endorse. Civility derives its 
importance from the way it expresses respect for the freedom of our fellow citizens, and 
that freedom brings responsibility into the picture. We respect our fellow citizens as free, 
rational, self-directed beings who can exert a form of control over their own beliefs and 
actions. Thus they can be causally responsible for some of their beliefs, ends, 
preferences, and actions. These are proper objects of praise and blame. 
One might object that Rawls is rightly sceptical about our responsibility for our 
comprehensive doctrines.  
 
It is not for reasons of impartiality and simplicity alone that [the veil of ignorance 
blocks out knowledge of conceptions of the good]. Our final ends (as limited by 
notions of the right) depend on our abilities and opportunities, on the numerous 
contingencies that have shaped our attachments and affections. That we have 
one conception of the good rather than another is not relevant from a moral 
standpoint. In acquiring it we are influenced by the same sort of contingencies 
that lead us to rule out knowledge of our sex and class.19  
 
That is part of Rawls’ specific conception of justice, but it is not part of the 
general structure of Political Liberalism. Rawls in this passage is discussing what ought 
to be excluded from his hypothetical choice scenario for choosing principles of justice. 
In the Original Position, people choose principles of justice from behind a veil of 
ignorance. Rawls thinks he has good reason to exclude knowledge of one’s conception 
of the good, because one’s conception of the good can be determined by morally 
arbitrary contingencies. 
However, this is just Rawls’ specific way of giving a theory of justice. The Original 
Position is only one among many public, political methods for choosing principles of 
justice. Even if conceptions of the good are ‘morally arbitrary’ from the perspective of his 
Original Position, political liberalism need not always treat them as such. Political 
liberalism is committed to our capacity to be causally responsible for our conceptions of 
the good. Without that commitment, Rawls’ conception of the person and the moral duty 	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  of civility no longer make sense. His conception of the person includes the powers that 
make us capable of being causally responsible, and the duty of civility expresses a form 
of respect for our fellow citizens as free and capable of being responsible. Therefore 
political liberalism leaves space to propose my novel form of luck egalitarianism. 
The first moral power of Rawls’ political conception of the person should be 
understood in a very general way. We see each other as able to create, revise, and 
pursue comprehensive conceptions of the good, but also as able to exert that power 
over our tastes, our desires, our intentions, and so on. Rawls says that citizens simply 
see each other as free, and it is equally true that they see each other as being 
responsible. We see each other as having certain obligations, but also as being causally 
responsible for at least some of our beliefs, actions, tastes, talents, and preferences. 
We see each other as appropriate objects of praise, blame, punishment, and reward. All 
this is inextricably embedded in the public culture of the democratic state, and is a 
foundational feature of political liberalism. 
This is all that a political form of luck egalitarianism needs. It need not take any 
position on the metaphysics of free will. It can elaborate these fundamental components 
of responsibility in solely political terms. Recall that the political is characterized by three 
criteria: applying to the basic structure of society, being presented independently of any 
comprehensive doctrine, and being elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas 
viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society.20 The building 
blocks of responsibility, even causal responsibility, are already found in Rawls. They just 
need to be elaborated in a political rather than metaphysical way. The finished theory 
will not only comprise beliefs that are already widely agreed upon in the public culture, 
but the form of elaboration meets Rawls’ three criteria for being political, and therefore 
the elaboration remains endorsable, in principle, by all citizens. Thus even though 
Rawls’ own political conception of justice is not luck egalitarian, his higher-level theory 
of the political leaves us room to articulate a political version of luck egalitarianism as an 
alternative to his difference principle. 
Of course my strategy still raises comprehensive questions of responsibility and 
freedom. As philosophers, we want to ask further questions about this moral power, for 
example, what sort of agency it provides, and how it fits into the causal structure of the 
world. Those are questions of moral responsibility and metaphysics that go beyond the 
political. This political conception applies to the basic structure and constitutional 
essentials only. It is useful for generating principles that show us the general 
requirements of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens in society, and that help us 
design institutions that will encourage such a fair distribution. As in Rawls’ view, there 
remains room for philosophical and policy debate based on comprehensive reasoning 
outside those domains. 
Blake and Risse provide the only prior work on the relationship between political 
liberalism and luck egalitarianism. They conclude that luck egalitarianism is necessarily 
comprehensive, not political. I will provide a reading of Rawls to support my claim that 
luck egalitarianism can rely on a political conception of causal responsibility. I will also 
argue that anyone who thinks my version of luck egalitarianism unavoidably leads to 
comprehensive metaphysical problems should have precisely the same worry about 
Rawls’ political liberalism. This is not an appeal to Rawls as an authority figure, but a 	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  clarification of the surprisingly broad commitments that follow from such an objection to 
my view. If Blake and Risse are correct, then any appeal to causal responsibility must 
be comprehensive and not political. Since the foundations of political liberalism implicitly 
invoke causal responsibility, their view makes Rawls’ political liberalism incoherent. I 
reject their analysis by providing a richer view of what can count as political. 
 
4. Causal Responsibility Can Be Political 
Blake and Risse argue that Rawls’ appeal to responsibility has nothing to do with causal 
responsibility. Further, they argue that any appeal to causal responsibility is 
comprehensive, not political. (For our purposes, their terms ‘attributive’ and ‘substantive’ 
are equivalent to my ‘causal’ and ‘role-based.’) 
 
This account of Rawls’ social division of responsibility should explain our claim 
that indirect theorists can make room for substantive responsibility by way of 
fleshing out the normatively important relationships whose presence they require 
to license inferences to distributive equality. For Rawls, these relationships are 
those of jointly participating in a fair system of cooperation, and it is features of 
that system that allow him to make room for a notion of responsibility. This notion 
of responsibility does not satisfy the demands on such a notion that arise in 
moral philosophy, and it does not gain its respectability through being 
embeddable into an overall plausible account of the free-will problem; it is, in 
particular, not reducible to notions of responsibility current in that context, such 
as responsibility drawing on causal involvement and responsibility drawing on 
voluntary choice. The Rawlsian notion of responsibility cannot play such roles, as 
much as these moral conceptions are unsuitable to ensure that burdens are 
distributed in a manner that guarantees the continuation of fair cooperation 
among free and equal citizens.21 
 
These “moral conceptions” of causal responsibility are not unsuitable to ensuring that 
burdens are distributed in a manner that guarantees the continuation of fair cooperation. 
On the contrary, we must appeal to causal responsibility in order to determine what 
amounts to fair cooperation and a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. Also, causal 
responsibility is implicitly invoked by Rawls in his arguments for political liberalism. 
Blake and Risse argue that there is a stark difference between the role that 
responsibility plays in moral philosophy and the role it plays in Rawls’ later political 
work. On their view, the luck egalitarian approach requires a theory of responsibility that 
does satisfy the demands of moral philosophy because of the reliance on causal 
responsibility. Rawls’ view, on the other hand, deals only with role-based responsibilities 
that derive from features of society and its institutions. This is a wrong approach to 
understanding responsibility generally and Rawls specifically. 
Blake and Risse argue that Rawls only makes room for responsibility as 
something purely institutional. It is only “features of that system” of cooperation that 
make room for a notion of responsibility. This institutional view is correct about role-
based responsibility in the later Rawls because our roles as participants in society as a 
cooperative venture generate certain obligations, such as only making political claims 	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  on others we think they could reasonably accept, bearing the costs of our own ends and 
preferences, and so on. However, this is not a complete account of responsibility’s 
place in his theory. Rawls implicitly appeals to causal responsibility as well. Blake and 
Risse rely too much on features of institutions and ignore relevant features of the 
persons living within those institutions. 
The purely role-based reading of Rawls is far too restrictive. Rawls says: 
 
variations in preferences and tastes are seen as our own responsibility. That we 
can take responsibility for our ends is part of what free citizens may expect of 
one another. Taking responsibility for our tastes and preferences, whether or not 
they have arisen from our actual choices, is a special case of that responsibility. 
As citizens with realized moral powers, this is something we must learn to deal 
with.22  
 
Citizens are obligated to deal with the consequences of their preferences and 
tastes, and this illuminates an aspect of the fair distribution of benefits and burdens. It is 
not in general unfair to bear the benefits and burdens of your own preferences and 
tastes. Thus justice does not require subsidizing expensive tastes, and one ought not 
make unreasonable claims on others to satisfy those tastes and preferences. Some 
citizen may need an abundance of white truffles, wagyu beef, and pre-phylloxera wines 
just to achieve an average level of welfare. For Rawls, this is not a matter of justice, and 
this person has no special claim to assistance in satisfying these tastes. As part of the 
fair terms of social cooperation, all citizens are obligated to deal with the consequences 
of their own tastes and preferences. It would be unreasonable to make demands on 
fellow citizens to subsidize those tastes and preferences. However, that is not all that is 
going on here. 
According to Blake and Risse’s reading, the citizen merely has an obligation to 
bear the costs of his own preferences and to refrain from making any political claims on 
fellow citizens to satisfy or subsidize those preferences. That is purely role-based, not 
causal. As they put it, “individuals will have to take substantive responsibility for their 
tastes and preferences regardless of whether these tastes and preferences can also be 
attributed to them and are thus their responsibility also in that sense. … [Therefore] 
responsibility as attributability, on this account, does not bear on substantive 
responsibility.”23 
Yet Rawls says only that we have responsibility for our preferences and tastes 
whether or not they “have arisen” by choice. Blake and Risse read that to mean they are 
always divorced from choice, that individuals must take substantive (role-based) 
responsibility for tastes and preferences “regardless of whether [they] can also be 
attributed to them.” They focus on the origin of such tastes and preferences and 
conclude that “responsibility as attributability, on this account, does not bear on 
substantive responsibility.” By “does not bear,” they must mean that attributive (causal) 
and substantive (role-based) responsibility are completely isolated from each other. 
There are two errors here. The first is to think that just because a citizen must 
“take responsibility” for tastes and preferences that did not arise through choice (and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Rawls,  Political Liberalism, p. 185. 
23 Blake and Risse,  “Two Models of Equality and Responsibility,” p. 183. 
	  hence they are not causally responsible for the origin of those tastes and preferences), 
this means that causal responsibility does not bear on role-based responsibility at all in 
this context. That conclusion does not follow, since one of our obligations could be to 
make an effort to take causal responsibility for our tastes and preferences, regardless of 
their origin. We could make this effort by struggling to revise those tastes and 
preferences. I give textual evidence below that this is Rawls’ actual view. 
Their second error is thinking of causal responsibility such that if something 
originated outside of causal responsibility, it forever remains outside. On the contrary, 
things that arise outside of an agent’s control can enter the space of causal 
responsibility by the agent choosing to endorse them, struggling against them, or 
successfully revising them. This can be true of preferences, tastes, ends, and talents. If 
these things are endorsed or revised, then they are no longer defined by their origin 
outside of choice, but instead as a product of agency. If the agent struggles yet fails to 
revise them, then (assuming he met a standard of adequate effort) they are no longer 
seen as his responsibility. That is not because of their origin outside of choice, but 
rather the way that they are not subject to the current control of his will. We need such a 
picture of responsibility to explain our agency, since our actions are embedded in a 
causal chain that can be traced backward in time to forces outside our control. Since the 
basis of political liberalism appeals to our freedom and agency, it must allow for some 
limited form of causal responsibility. 
These errors threaten the very foundation of political liberalism. That we can take 
control over things that arose outside of choice is strictly required for our agency. Blake 
and Risse are right to emphasize that according to Rawls it is our role-based obligation 
to “take responsibility” for tastes and preferences, to give up the idea that they generate 
special claims on resources or political obligations on other citizens. This is because we 
have an obligation to deal with the consequences of our own tastes, preferences, and 
aims, and an obligation to only make political claims on others that we think they could 
reasonably accept. It is unreasonable to suppose that others will accept the claim that 
my tastes and preferences deserve to be subsidized, so I am obligated to “take 
responsibility” for them. Blake and Risse think none of this involves causal 
responsibility, and that is where the problem arises. 
Our obligation here, according to my reading of the text, can include an obligation 
to make an effort to take causal responsibility. By that I mean making some effort to 
reject or revise those preferences or aspects of the self. Such efforts are constitutive of 
causal responsibility in these domains. Thus role-based responsibility leads directly into 
causal responsibility. 
Blake and Risse want to make a fundamental and impermeable distinction 
between role-based and causal responsibility. They claim that Rawls “disengages 
substantive responsibility from responsibility as attributability.” 24  However, such a 
separation is impossible to make, and it is also a mistake to ascribe that thesis to 
Rawls. Some role-based obligations make direct reference to causal responsibility. 
Blake and Risse try to make the political/comprehensive distinction apply to different 
types of responsibility, and conclude that the political contains nothing more than role-
based responsibility. We must reject that picture for my metaphor of the trunk and its 
roots. Both role-based and causal responsibility are present in the trunk. The 	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  political/comprehensive distinction cuts horizontally and separates different types of 
explanations, not different types of responsibility. 
 
5. Why Not Restrict the View to Claims?  
At this point, one could object that my view takes on problems that it is best to avoid. 
Why not go along with Blake and Risse and think that what matters is not an obligation 
to revise your own ends and preferences, but just an obligation to revise the claims that 
you make on others? If we can satisfy our role-based responsibility to restrict the claims 
that we make on others, why have any concern with an obligation to revise one’s ends 
and preferences? That just brings in added complexity and makes several unnecessary 
commitments regarding causal responsibility. 
My first answer is that without having a view of the political that includes aspects 
of causal responsibility, you do not have an adequate foundation for political liberalism. 
Indeed, political liberalism becomes incoherent. Our conception of ourselves as free 
and in possession of a moral power to form and revise a conception of the good 
provides the basis for a political elaboration that will lead us to a theory of causal 
responsibility. Therefore causal responsibility is already in view. Put another way, if we 
deny that the political can include causal responsibility, we undermine the foundations 
of political liberalism. I think Rawls gives a compelling case for political liberalism, 
though I do not have space to fully defend his arguments here. Once you accept his 
arguments for political liberalism, causal responsibility is already on the table.  
My second answer is that it is simply an illusion to think we can deal solely in 
role-based responsibility. The two forms of responsibility cannot be completely 
separated. This is true both in terms of reaching the most philosophically sound view 
and in terms of giving a textually faithful reading of Political Liberalism. There are role-
based responsibilities that explicitly invoke causal responsibility, and these are crucial to 
understanding equality. Therefore any attempt to completely separate these two forms 
of responsibility must fail. 
In Rawls’ view, there must be more involved here than a role-based responsibility 
to refrain from making claims. When Rawls says we must “take responsibility” and 
“learn to deal with” preferences that do not arise from choice, what does he mean? Is it 
merely admitting that I ought not make political claims on my fellow citizens to subsidize 
my preferences? On that reading, taking responsibility is just a form of acquiescence, of 
refraining from making claims on others. The textual evidence cited below shows that 
there is more at work than acquiescence because Rawls explicitly links our obligation to 
take responsibility for our tastes and preferences to our moral power to form, revise, 
and pursue a conception of the good. This implies that our responsibility is to form and 
revise our tastes and preferences, not merely to refrain from making claims on others to 
aid the satisfaction of our given desires and preferences. 
We do have an obligation to refrain from making unreasonable claims on fellow 
citizens. This is an aspect of the second moral power cited by Rawls, the ability to 
propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation. For example, I do not have a 
valid claim that my fellow citizens ought to help satisfy my expensive tastes, just 
because otherwise I will have a below-average level of welfare. My tastes are my 
responsibility. However, if all that is at play is a form of acquiescence and refraining 
from making claims, why would Rawls link this issue to our moral power to form, revise, 
	  and pursue a conception of the good? It would have been quite enough to link this to 
our power to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation. That is all you would 
need to handle this issue in terms of a role-based obligation to refrain from making 
certain types of claims. 
Instead, Rawls explicitly links this issue to the moral power that makes us 
capable of being causally responsible. We can be causally responsible for that which 
we freely create, revise, and pursue. Taking responsibility for, and dealing with, 
problematic or expensive tastes and preferences means struggling to revise them, and 
this is causal responsibility. Of course those attempts will not always be successful, but 
sometimes they will be. My role-based responsibility includes an obligation to do my 
best to take causal responsibility for these preferences. If I take a given preference and 
successfully revise it, I am causally responsible for that revision, and causally 
responsible for the preference that exists after the revision. 
We find more evidence in Lectures I and V of Political Liberalism, where Rawls 
treats this discussion of responsibility for tastes and preferences as a special case of 
our responsibility for our aims.25 In Lecture I, Rawls states that “citizens are thought to 
be capable of adjusting their aims and aspirations in light of what they can reasonably 
expect to provide for.”26 In Lecture V, he claims that “taking responsibility” for our tastes 
and preferences is a “special case” of our responsibility for our aims. He clearly links our 
responsibility for our tastes and preferences to a power we can exert upon them, not 
merely a power to refrain from making claims on others while our ends and preferences 
remain constant. He discusses our capacity and obligation to adjust these aspects of 
the self, not merely to adjust the political claims that we make on fellow citizens. That 
means we are dealing with the first moral power, not just the second, and the first is a 
sufficient basis for elaborating a view of causal responsibility. 
According to Rawls, citizens are thought to be capable of adjusting their tastes 
and preferences in light of what they can reasonably expect to provide for. I emphasize 
that citizens “are thought” to have this capability; it is a political belief that is deeply 
embedded in the public culture. If I take an unchosen preference and exert my first 
moral power in a way that revises the preference, I have taken causal responsibility for 
my preferences. I am responsible for the changing (or abandoning) of the old 
preference, and for the nature and creation of the new preference. If my efforts meet 
some standard of adequacy, yet are incapable of revising this preference, then I am not 
causally responsible for the preference. This is not because the preference originated 
outside of choice, but because it is now impervious to my choices and efforts, assuming 
I meet the normative standard of how much effort a citizen is obligated to exert in this 
context. So the power to which Rawls appeals is deeply tied to causal responsibility. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls works with a conception of the person that is 
political, not comprehensive and metaphysical. If our moral powers involve causal 
responsibility in the way just outlined, and causal responsibility can only be understood 
in comprehensive metaphysical terms as Scheffler, Blake, and Risse argue, then Rawls 
failed to keep political liberalism political.  
However, there is nothing in the political conception of responsibility that requires 
us to give an explanation of this causal component all the way down to its metaphysical 	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  basis. It is deeply embedded in the public culture that citizens see themselves as having 
the capacities that constitute causal responsibility. Yet there is no complete account of 
the metaphysics of those capacities embedded in the public culture. We have political 
commitments that, when analyzed completely, raise metaphysical puzzles. That does 
not mean those commitments go beyond the political. 
My view obviously raises questions about responsibility that lead to deep 
metaphysical disputes. I agree with Cohen’s remark, cited earlier, that we need to follow 
these arguments as they lead us into metaphysics—but we do that as a comprehensive 
investigation of moral philosophy and free will, not as a political investigation into the 
question of what responsibility has to do with distributive justice. If one objects that my 
view is comprehensive just so long as it raises these comprehensive questions, then 
Rawls’ view looks no different. His claims about our ability to freely create, revise, and 
pursue a comprehensive conception of the good alone are sufficient to raise 
comprehensive questions about free will. His remarks on our ability to revise our 
preferences and desires are perhaps even more problematic, since they are less 
theoretical and even more directly influenced by upbringing and socialization. They 
raise deep questions about how we can be free despite our susceptibility to external 
causal influences. Yet, because Rawls’ view requires no specific answer to those 
comprehensive questions, it remains political. Also, Rawls’ political conceptions of 
autonomy and objectivity lead us to ask comprehensive questions about free will and 
epistemology. That does not mean Rawls’ views there are also comprehensive. 
If the political/comprehensive distinction aligned with the distinction between role-
based and causal responsibility, then political appeals to responsibility would be purely 
role-based, and luck egalitarianism could not be a political theory. There are three 
reasons why the political/comprehensive distinction cannot be aligned with the role-
based/causal distinction. First, role-based and causal responsibility are inseparable, 
especially in the context of political philosophy and egalitarian theory. A role-based 
obligation may directly involve causal responsibility, such as our obligation to revise our 
tastes and preferences. Second, it is an implicit part of our public culture that we share 
a conception of responsibility that includes causal responsibility. This is implicit in the 
way citizens are thought to have the capability to revise aspects of their own selves, and 
in the way they are seen as appropriate objects of praise, blame, punishment, and 
reward. Third, this view is based on a particular reading of Rawls that I have shown to 
be incorrect. Rawls’ political conception of the person as having a moral power to form 
and revise conceptions of the good, preferences, tastes, and ends provides a basis 
from which we can elaborate a political conception of causal responsibility. His view that 
we must “take responsibility” for our own ends, tastes, and preferences invokes causal 
responsibility. Indeed, since all forms of liberalism emphasize autonomy, it may turn out 
that the standard attacks on luck egalitarianism amount to attacks on all forms of 
liberalism. 
I conclude that luck egalitarianism is compatible with political liberalism and can 
be fully articulated in political terms. Two strategies for responding to my arguments are 
worth mentioning. The first is to accept that various criticisms of luck egalitarianism turn 
out to be attacks on political liberalism and conclude that we ought to reject political 
liberalism. The second is to argue that liberalism should rely on some controversial 
metaphysical views, and these include views about responsibility, and therefore luck 
	  egalitarianism should not be constrained to Rawls’ notion of the political. I have 
explained why I do not pursue these strategies, but they are rivals to my view.  
 
6. Deep Conflicts with Comprehensive Doctrines 
One might object that my political conception of responsibility will conflict with several 
comprehensive doctrines, and thus by Rawls’ standards is not a political conception at 
all. Rawls claims that “[t]he other reason political values normally win out is that severe 
conflicts with other values are much reduced. This is because when an overlapping 
consensus supports the political conception, this conception is not viewed as 
incompatible with basic religious, philosophical, and moral values.”27 My view seems 
incompatible with several comprehensive doctrines that, while perhaps not popular or 
basic, are not insignificant either. These include the doctrines of Calvinists, those who 
have scientific reasons for rejecting free will and responsibility, and those who have 
philosophical reasons for rejecting free will and responsibility. How can my view be 
political and thus, in principle, endorsable by all citizens, yet directly contradict those 
apparently reasonable comprehensive doctrines?  
These pessimists can take the instrumentalist line about responsibility discussed 
earlier. They can still have a warranted belief that the practices of praising, blaming, 
punishing, rewarding, and having people bear the benefits and burdens of their own 
choices can shape future behaviour. Rawls never demands that for something to be 
political, it must be acceptable as true by all reasonable citizens. It must be acceptable 
as true or reasonable. If these pessimists think there is truth in the instrumentalist view, 
they can affirm the whole political conception of responsibility as reasonable. 
Now, there will be those who do not find that view acceptable, perhaps because 
they think it is duplicitous or manipulative or represents a way of organizing society that 
is not transparent or honest. These are familiar objections to some forms of utilitarian 
planning, and one could raise them in this context as well. Indeed, I think the 
instrumentalist line is not in harmony with the respect for fellow citizens that is so crucial 
to Rawls’ form of political liberalism. This move is too close to what Rawls calls a 
“modus vivendi,” a merely strategic form of agreement that is unstable.28 
I therefore offer a second response that is an affirmation of respect for one’s 
fellow citizens. When Rawls discusses the difference between political and 
comprehensive justification, he says that in full comprehensive justification a citizen 
accepts a political conception of justice and fills out its justification by embedding it in 
some way into a comprehensive doctrine as either true or reasonable, depending on 
what that doctrine allows.29 Now, if a commitment to responsibility is deeply embedded 
in the public culture of a democracy, and if we see that the foundation of Rawls’ political 
liberalism is all we need to elaborate a political conception of responsibility, then a 
refusal to affirm any political conception of responsibility looks like an unreasonable, 
radically revisionist view that amounts to a rejection of political liberalism. The pessimist 
must also reject Rawls’ conception of the person and his view of political liberalism.  
What the pessimist ought to do is accept a political conception of responsibility 
as reasonable, just not as true. This is a form of sensitivity to what others can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Rawls,  Political Liberalism, p. 15. 
28 Rawls,  Political Liberalism, p. 148. 
29 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 386. 
	  reasonably endorse, and sensitivity to those beliefs and practices that are deeply 
embedded in the public culture. This is solely for matters of basic justice and 
constitutional essentials; the pessimist violates no norms by appealing to his 
comprehensive view in other matters. My appeal to abiding features of institutions, and 
beliefs deeply embedded in the public culture, is closely related to P.F. Strawson’s 
resolution of the free will problem.30 Strawson argued that the reactive attitudes (such 
as resentment and indignation) are not things we can give up, no matter what 
theoretical beliefs we may have about free will and moral responsibility. Even if we 
could give them up, he argues that this form of social life is more valuable than any 
alternative in which interpersonal relationships are not structured by the reactive 
attitudes. That idea applies here. Rawls’ view of political liberalism makes concessions 
to the ideas and practices implicit in the public culture, and clearly a commitment to 
responsibility is a deep and abiding part of our public culture. All the pessimist needs to 
do is make a reasonable political concession to that fact, he need not acknowledge any 
truth in the political conception of responsibility. That we generally take a reactive, not 
objective, stance toward each other is something deeply embedded in our public 
political culture. “Our natural disposition to such attitudes and judgments is naturally 
secured against arguments suggesting they are in principle unwarranted or 
unjustified.”31 Our nature as social beings means that we will continue to see each other 
as capable of being responsible. But if we were to take the objective stance towards 
each other, then Rawls’ duty of civility would lose its force. The duty of civility no longer 
could be a form of respect for the freedom of our fellow citizens, so why would we not 
simply decide fundamental political questions on what we think are the strongest 
comprehensive reasons?  
This linking of reactive attitudes and political liberalism also provides an answer 
to a compelling objection to Strawson: whether it is difficult or impossible to give up a 
set of practices and attitudes has nothing to do with the fact of the matter.32 It has no 
bearing on whether we are capable of being genuinely responsible for our actions. My 
approach can accommodate that objection by encouraging the pessimist to merely 
affirm a political conception of responsibility as reasonable, not as true. Only on matters 
of basic justice and constitutional essentials do they need to make any concession to 
Strawson’s point. Outside those domains, their objections can stand.  
 
7. Conclusion  
I first applied Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive to 
conceptions of responsibility. I then argued against the view that the political only 
includes role-based responsibility. We ought to read Rawls’ political conception of the 
person as having moral powers, and his claims about our obligations to take 
responsibility for our ends and preferences, as implicitly appealing to causal 
responsibility. It turns out that many attacks on luck egalitarianism are also attacks upon 
political liberalism. This rich and inclusive interpretation of the political is a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays, (New York: Methuen, 1974).  
31 P.F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987), p. 41. 
32 For example, see M.A.L. Oshana, “Ascriptions of Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 
(1997), no. 1, p. 76. 
	  accurate and powerful reading of Political Liberalism than the alternative provided by 
Blake and Risse. The domain of the political is not isolated from the comprehensive; 
genuinely political conceptions of responsibility (or objectivity, autonomy, justice) can 
directly raise comprehensive questions. Finally, I presented a new strategy for 
articulating a luck egalitarian theory of equality that relies on a merely political 
conception of responsibility. This strategy allows us to keep the worthwhile aspects of 
luck egalitarianism while resolving its deep problems with endorsability and scepticism 
about free will. 
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